Middle East arms control

Rapid changes in the world environment and the easing of the East-West superpower confrontation have created a sense of opportunity and a spirit of optimism with respect to solving the intractable problems of the world's political environment. Notably, following the allied success in Desert Storm there arose an international outcry over the unbridled proliferation of conventional arms in the region of the Middle East. At the same time, the atmosphere of diplomatic cooperation and military cohesion engendered by the campaign against Iraq produced a window of opportunity during which a new, positive effort could be made to resolve the difficult political problems that have been the foundation of Middle East conflict for the past seventy-five years. The Madrid Peace Process was indicative of the desire to exploit the window of opportunity to bring about peace and stability between the Israelis and Arab states.^ Likewise, the postwar strengthening of US alliances with several of the Persian Gulf states was indicative of US desire to influence the stability of the region. In response to concerns voiced internationally and domestically, and as a further effort to influence stability in the region, the bush administration announced initiatives to curb the proliferation of weapons in the Middle East. Nuclear weapons, chemical and biological munitions, missile technology, and conventional arms transfers all became issues of central focus for a US administration interested in leveraging peace and stability in the Middle East, retaining access to petroleum resources, securing a free and independent Israel, and working toward a just resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Restraining the proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East has been the centerpiece of an ongoing series of negotiations among the five major suppliers of conventional weapons.^ The aim for this paper is twofold: to evaluate the prospects for success of an externally imposed conventional arms restraint policy, and based upon the results of that evaluation, to recommend a policy direction that will allow the US to achieve its objectives and secure its vital interests in the region. This paper argues that external conventional arms restraints imposed on the Middle East will not succeed. Further, the authors argue that the best policy direction to achieve peace and stability in the region while securing US interests is through constructive engagement with the states in the region. The authors conclude that careful exercise of US influence and leverage gained through security relationships, including the transfer of defense equipment, is a policy direction that is more likely to result in positive change in the political environment of the region and successful achievement of US objectives.