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Studying first-strike stability with knowledge-based models of human decision-making

Studying first-strike stability with knowledge-based models of human decision-making

Davis, Paul K.

About this book

First-strike stability depends on the improbability of crises and the improbability that crises would result in first strikes. This study focuses on the latter criterion, which in turn depends on crisis decisionmaking by human beings. The report argues that efforts to understand and improve first-strike stability should be guided by a formal theory of human decisionmaking that accounts for behavioral factors such as mindset, desperation, fatalism, perceptions, and fears. The author identifies three principal mechanisms for improving first-strike stability: (1) improve force-posture stability; (2) review and adjust nuclear policies and doctrine, and the way they are discussed; and (3) improve the likely quality of crisis decisionmaking through efforts involving education, exercises, and staffing.

Details

OL Work ID
OL862846W

Subjects

Nuclear crisis stabilityFirst strike (Nuclear strategy)Decision makingNuclear warfare

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