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Do financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers?

Do financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers?2008

Jennifer L. Steele

About this book

This study capitalizes on a natural experiment that occurred in California between 2000-01 and 2001-02, when the state offered a competitive $20,000 incentive called the Governor's Teaching Fellowship (GTF) to attract 1,250 academically talented, novice teachers to designated low-performing schools and retain them in those schools for at least four years. The abrupt introduction of the GTF program provides an opportunity to use a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the program's causal impact on the propensity of academically talented, novice teachers to begin and continue working in low-performing schools. Using longitudinal employment data for 19,822 Californians enrolled in teacher licensure programs from 1998 through 2002, I estimate that the availability of the GTF increased by 3.4 percentage points, or 8.4 percent, the probability that academically talented licensure candidates entered low-performing schools within three years after licensure program enrollment. Furthermore, estimates of the GTF effect are similar across the distribution of low-performing schools. However, among academically talented teachers who entered low-performing schools, the GTF program does not appear to have influenced the length of time they remained in those schools.

Details

First published
2008
OL Work ID
OL37005629W

Subjects

TeachersRecruitingTeacher turnoverJob satisfaction

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Book data from Open Library. Cover images courtesy of Open Library.