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Equilibrium impotence

Equilibrium impotence

John Joseph Wallis

About this book

"Why did states dominate investments in economic development in early America? Between 1787 and 1860, the national government spent $54 million on promoting transportation infrastructure while the states spent $450 million. Using models of legislative choice, we show that Congress could not finance projects that provided benefits to a minority of districts while spreading the taxes over all. Although states faced the same political problems, they used benefit taxation schemes -- for example, by assessing property taxes on the basis of the expected increase in value due to an infrastructure investment. The U.S. Constitution prohibited the federal government from using benefit taxation. Moreover, the federal government%u2019s expenditures were concentrated in collections small projects -- such as lighthouses and rivers and harbors -- that spent money in all districts. Federal inaction was the result of the equilibrium political forces in Congress, and hence an equilibrium impotence"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Details

OL Work ID
OL5889802W

Subjects

Benefit theoryFinanceHistoryInfrastructure (Economics)StatesTaxation

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