Drew Fudenberg

The theory of learning in games

1998

Game Theory

1991

Dynamic models of oligopoly

1986

Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

Sequential bargaining with many buyers

Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

Predation without reputation

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets

Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

Learning mixed equilibria

Self-confirming equilibrium

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization

A long-run collaboration on long-run games

Bo yi lun

Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

The neo-Luddite's lament

Learning to play Bayesian games

Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good