Oliver D. Hart
31 works on record
Works
Firms, contracts, and financial structure
1995
Property rights and the nature of the firm
1988
Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital
Vertical integration and market foreclosure
Capital structure as a control mechanism in corporations
Contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics
Bargaining and strikes
Default and renegotiation
A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claims
The theory of contracts
Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
A theory of firm scope
Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
2007
Contracts as reference points
2006
Agreeing now to agree later
2004
Norms and the theory of the firm
2001
Financial contracting
2001
Different approaches to bankruptcy
2000
On the design of hierarchies
1999
Cooperatives vs. outside ownership
1998
Foundations of incomplete contracts
1998
The proper scope of government
1996
Debt and seniority
1994
Capital structure decisions of a public company
1994
Reference points and the theory of the firm
An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
Agreeing now to argue later
Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate control
Improving bankruptcy protection
现代合约理论